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‘an actual present alive with multiple futures’: Narrative, Memory and 
Time in Ben Lerner’s 10:04 
 
This essay reads Ben Lerner’s second novel, 10:04, alongside contemporary 
accounts of narrative time and digital memory technologies, and argues that this 
narrative reflects on a shift in temporality, whereby present experience is 
increasingly relegated to future recollection. Bernard Stiegler provides a useful 
analysis of this situation, as his philosophical account of technics foregrounds 
memory’s reliance on technology, whereby the present is increasingly archived 
as a future memory. Stiegler also insists that every tool carries within itself a 
capacity for re-invention and projection into different futures, and this essay 
reads narrative form in this sense of an inventive technics capable of projecting 
us not into actual futures, but into a sense of future possibility. Lerner’s narrator 
may be read as seeking to open up the future by revisiting possibilities which his 
past self once imagined, and also by imagining future moments of retrospect 
from which he will one day have recounted his experience. It is in the mode of 
the anticipation of retrospection that a sense of the future is kept open in this 
novel, despite the temporally foreclosed structure of an already written narrative. 
Keywords: narrative; memory; time; future; prolepsis; Ben Lerner; Bernard 
Stiegler; Mark Currie 
 
 
[Each] of us is constantly striving to reorganize mere chronology into some 
meaningful pattern, to narrate our pasts in a way that makes a future thinkable.1 
 
[The] world of the future is already falling in an avalanche on the memory of the 
past.2 
 
The tool is already a projection screen, since the adoption of such a past is – 
immediately – adopting the capacity to project a future.3 
 
 
In 10:04 (2014), Ben Lerner’s fictional avatar, Ben,4 has been invited to give a speech 
before an august audience of academics and writers at Columbia School of the Arts. 
This speech is interesting for two reasons: firstly, it foregrounds the importance of 
memory and its relation to futurity in this novel; and secondly, it reflects on the impact 
of mass media on personal memory. As often happens with memories of mass mediated 
events, Ben’s recollection is here of a national tragedy: 
In the story I’ve been telling myself lately, I became a poet, or became interested in 
becoming a poet, on January twenty-eighth, 1986, at the age of seven. Like most 
Americans who were alive at that time, I have a clear memory of watching the 
space shuttle Challenger disintegrate seventy-three seconds into flight … Can I ask 
you, by a show of hands, to indicate if you watched the Challenger disaster live? 
Right. The majority of Americans who are over thirty years old today remember 
the shuttle crumble live on TV. It’s consistently noted as the dawning of our era of 
live disaster and simulcast wars: O.J. Simpson fleeing in the white Bronco, the 
towers collapsing, etc., although there had of course been other televised traumas 
before. I don’t have a single friend who doesn’t remember watching it as it 
happened – not as a replay later when you knew the shuttle was doomed, but when 
you expected the shuttle disappear successfully into space and instead saw it 
engulfed in a giant fireball.5 
The child Ben here seems to experience, in philosopher Bernard Stiegler’s terms, ‘the 
veritable planetary dimension of selection and diffusion, at the speed of light, of the 
industrial construction of the present.’6 Stiegler himself, coincidentally, refers to the 
Challenger shuttle disaster, in Technics and Time, 2 (2008): 
the ideal, according to the press, would be the suppression of all delay in 
transmission. The explosion of the space shuttle “Challenger” during the live 
coverage of its 1986 launch became an event of major proportions in the Reagan 
administration, which had organised a super-production of [media] “placement” on 
the mission’s success. The death of eight people in an extraordinarily dangerous 
undertaking of this kind would not be exceptional in itself. But these deaths, which 
were covered live, as they occurred, for the vast majority of the planet, were 
 
(potentially) a political catastrophe and a sensational tragedy. The event-ability of 
an event is thus inseparable from the media, which, at the very least “co-produced” 
it.7 
For Stiegler, the significance of the coverage of this particular event is that it brings into 
greater relief a new experience of time, one which has been shaped by the advent of, 
firstly, televisual, video and eventually digital media technologies. This new experience 
of time is one whereby the future tense is becoming (and arguably has been becoming 
since the heyday of postmodernism) increasingly dominant both in culture and 
philosophical critiques of culture. When Stiegler claims that the media ‘co-produced’ 
the event shown to the public, he is referring to the programmability of media content: 
certain events, such as a space shuttle launch, are guaranteed media coverage, and this 
creates future expectation for the audience. As so many millions come to view the same 
event, they come to share these programmed expectations, which, once mediated, may 
become memories. In this sense, the threat of the ‘standardisation’ of consciousness 
seems to be on the horizon. Stiegler tends to err on the side of hyperbole in his 
Adornian prognostications for mass culture, fearing ‘the politico-spiritual, if not also of 
[sic] the material and corporeal, apocalypse: in some respects, this would be a neutron 
bomb of the mind, whose explosion would mean uninhabited matter and corporeality – 
a world of automatons.’8 
The problem with Stiegler’s account of what he refers to as the malaise of 
contemporary mnemotechnologies (technologies that remember on our behalf) is that it 
neglects to reflect on how narrative always operates alongside memory. Memory is 
never simply re-collected, but recounted via its narrativisation, and this means that the 
past retains its capacity for future reinvention. Lerner’s autobiographical memory 
fiction, I suggest, thinks through the ways in which the past is continually reshaped 
according to the demands of the story one is telling, and this always means the 
 
possibility of re-telling. This kind of reshaping of the past happens for Ben when he 
realises that he could not have witnessed the Challenger disaster live, as he originally 
claimed. Contrary to his confidence of having seen the space-shuttle explode ‘as it 
happened’,  
almost nobody saw it live: 1986 was early in the history of cable news, and 
although CNN carried the launch live, not that many of us just happened to be 
watching CNN in the middle of a working day, a school day … I remember tears in 
Mrs. Greiner’s eyes and the students’ initial incomprehension, some awkward 
laughter. But neither of us did see it: Randolph Elementary School in Topeka 
wasn’t part of that broadcast. So unless you were watching CNN, or were in one of 
the special classrooms, you didn’t witness it in the present tense.9 
This realisation forces him to admit: ‘at the beginning of my story of origins is a false 
memory of a moving image. I didn’t see it live.’10 Ben’s memory-cum-story has 
evidently combined several recollections of his own and his peers’ reactions to this 
tragic event, and his narratively-compelled imagination then played its role in 
supporting this recollective effort with related images circulating in the media after the 
event and congregating around the light projected by anamnesis.  
For a memorable metaphor of how this happens, we might turn to Victor 
Burgin’s account of remembering a film, in that the way we (mis)remember a film is 
often comparable to the way we (mis)remember our own experience. Burgin uses a 
fittingly astronautical image to describe the process of recalling scenes from films we 
have partially forgotten: 
The narratives [of these films] have dropped away, like those rockets that 
disintegrate in the atmosphere once they have placed their small payloads in orbit. 
Detached from their original settings each scene is now the satellite of the other. 
Each echoes the other, increasingly merges with the other, and I experience a kind 
of fascinated incomprehension before the hybrid object they have become.11  
 
When it comes to remembering our own experience, like the experience of 
remembering fragments of a film we do not entirely recall, these mnemonic ‘hybrid 
objects’ are produced by the combined efforts of recollection and imagination. 
Fragments of a film’s narrative are often remembered alongside one’s own experience, 
so that the public is seen to be ever converging on, and sometimes even merging with, 
the private, as Burgin argues: 
The more the film is distanced in memory, the more the binding effect of the 
narrative is loosened. The sequence breaks apart. The fragments go adrift and enter 
into new combinations, more or less transitory, in the eddies of memory: memories 
of other films, and memories of real events.12  
This implies that our own past is often seen through a kind of superimposed screen of 
personal memory combined with various sequence-images from films and other visual 
media. Public and private are seen to co-habitate in individual memory, at times almost 
indiscernibly. Yet, as Burgin’s osmotic metaphor implies but does not quite say, the 
way that the past is seen – in my own figure of the superimposed screen – is precisely 
through one’s articulation of memory as one’s own narrative. The fragments of public 
and private memory can only ever ‘enter into new combinations’ by means of their 
narrativisation. This is why Ben’s memory of this mediated tragic event is actually a 
narrative fiction constructed after the event took place, and this obviously undermines 
Stiegler’s prognosis of psychic-standardisation caused by global media coverage. That 
is to say, we all remember differently, because we (yet) retain the capacity to narrativise 
(hence, reinterpret) our past experience, and this is the foundational premise for 
Lerner’s project of writing memory in a media-saturated age. 
In drawing attention to memory and narrative’s interdependence in this manner, 
this essay seeks to answer two related questions. Firstly, how might Lerner’s second 
novel be said to reflect on the contemporary philosophical understanding of time, where 
 
the present is increasingly experienced as though already a future memory? Secondly, 
how can Lerner’s narrator make good on his promise to project himself into different 
futures, to render futurity within the closed temporal loop of narrative temporality? 
Reflection on these questions will draw on resources provided by narrative theory, 
specifically on Mark Currie’s work on prolepsis and narrative time. My reading of 
Lerner’s novel situates it in a broader genre commonly referred to as ‘autofiction,’ 
where the borders separating autobiography and fiction are porous and allow for the 
continual cross-pollination of the real and the fictional. However, I wish to focus less on 
the fictionality of this narrative and more on its form: within this autofictional account 
of both real and imagined memories, the past is brought back to life through the 
narrator’s play with tense and his reflections on the act of self-narration itself. This 
essay thinks of narrative as a kind of possibility that brings about acts of remembrance: 
for Lerner’s narrator, the past is remembered so that it might be re-told. In talking about 
narrative as possibility in this manner, I invoke Stiegler’s notion of writing as technics, 
a prosthetic technology that makes invention possible, and examine Lerner’s strategies 
for the re-invention of the narration of past experience.13 
The guiding supposition for this discussion of the intersection of the novelistic 
and the philosophical is that contemporary temporality is characterised by a sense of 
depresentification, in that our digitally-mediated reality consigns the present moment to 
the future, often in the present’s very eventfulness. In this regard, Currie argues that 
recent advances in recording technologies have only contributed to this sense of life 
being experienced in the narrative mode, before it is actually narrated by a historical 
subject: ‘Video recording and photography, like the preterite tense, structure the present 
as the object of a future memory. The act of recoding installs in the present an 
anticipated future from which the present will be re-experienced as representation of the 
 
past, or an infinite sequence of future presents from which moments can be 
recollected.’14 As present experience is already recorded and thus stored for its future 
recollection, our focus, as both Currie and Stiegler contend, increasingly shifts to what 
experience will come to mean. Lerner’s novel may be read as expressive of this shift in, 
as it were, the tense structure of our experience, whereby the present is increasingly 
made to wear the burden of its future memory. Indeed, we shall see that Lerner’s 
narrator is concerned with imagining, in Currie’s phrase, ‘an infinite sequence of future 
presents from which moments can be recollected.’ 
 
Narrative form and future possibility 
Stiegler’s critique of memory in the contemporary age is framed by the notion of 
technics as a necessary adjunct to human being, and for Stiegler writing is humanity’s 
richest technics.15 Writing in a sense embodies the very idea of technics, as it is the 
primary technology used for the preservation of mnemonic traces. According to 
Stiegler, technics is the site/sight of possibility, of creation: ‘technics is the inscription, 
within a living being, of a possible.’16 This future-gazing definition of technics is 
derived from the Derridean conceptualization of the trace structure of the sign: every 
sign is that which is predicated upon the possibility of its future repetition; the trace 
only realises itself when it is repeated. The trace is that which ‘exists’ in a state of 
perpetual becoming, never fully coinciding with itself. The trace is shifty cannot be 
caught with the net of precise definition.17 What this means is that writing, as a technics 
that is composed of traces, always already has the future as its envisaged. Writing, in 
the form of narrative, provides that textual ‘site’ where the retrospect of memory meets 
the prospect of temporal becoming. Memory narratives articulate retrospection to 
prospection for identity, so that the identity of a character in medias res is being pulled, 
 
so to speak, both backwards into the past and forwards into the future.  
Stiegler’s own description of writing a sentence is already expressive of this 
temporal structure of narrative that articulates pastness to futurity: 
[The] moment of writing of any text: the writer inscribes the present at the moment 
it is present-ed in the specific form of an absolutely singular already-there. This 
precisely identified already-there [what has been written] provides the leisure, the 
latitude, to examine the initial writer’s reasoning – for that writer. In terms of what 
takes place as the writer writes, it might be said that the writing to come, the next 
sentence, connects with past-present writing as a reading of the already-there – a 
reading, interpretation and inscription (as new sentence) of différance concealed 
within the writing that is already-there.18 
Narrative, in this sense, is that form of writing as technics that gives temporal shape to a 
life. This is so because to write even a single sentence of the story of one’s life is 
already to think futurity (of one’s past self), for every sentence still to come is 
expressive of a possibility, but a possibility made possible by what has gone before it. 
Every new sentence is thus a reading of, and a creative response to, the ‘différance 
concealed within the writing that is already-there.’ Nevertheless, while the act of 
writing a narrative keeps the future open in this way, the future as it is represented in a 
completed narrative is necessarily a closed one. In narrative, the future is already there, 
in the pages to come.  
10:04 is a singular narrative that may be said to reflect on this impasse. Lerner’s 
autobiographical narrator repeatedly ‘projects’ himself forwards into imagined 
possibilities - often fearful ones - but he also imagines, crucially, how he will have 
looked back upon these possibilities. That is to say, this anxious narrator thinks of the 
future not in the future simple tense (at least not until the novel’s ending), but in the 
mode of the future perfect, also called the future anterior. The future anterior is a tense 
most comfortable within the parameters of narrative time, for it contains within itself an 
 
articulation of retrospect to prospect, and prospect to retrospect. Reflection on the future 
anterior is, as Currie reminds us, reflection on the very shape of narrative temporality: 
‘The future anterior gives us a grammatical form for the commingling of futurity and 
completion that [may be described] as a condition for narrative time.’19 
Lerner’s novel is able to formally reflect on the temporal shift caused by 
contemporary mnemotechnologies that Stiegler diagnoses, by making self-reflexive use 
of the conventions of the narrative representation of time. For Lerner’s narrator, the 
temporal accent is always falling on his future, and thinking about the future always 
raises the question of one’s identity. We find Ben explicitly reflecting on this question, 
when he claims: ‘discovering you are not identical with yourself even in the most 
disturbing and painful way still contains the glimmer, however refracted, of a world to 
come.’20 In Stiegler’s thought, the essence of identity is that it is perennially self-
imposed with this very question: ‘Who am I (still to come)?’21 Identity is the continual 
becoming of the self via its repetition of itself by means of symbolic/linguistic 
representations. The self is thus forever caught up in the shifting dialectic of repetition 
and difference.22 The figure of becoming has its face to the future, so that ‘I never cease 
to interpret myself as the retentional medium of myself; I never cease to interpret 
myself – and to write/interpret what is still to come, what is still unfolding of what has 
already occurred.’23 We can see that in Stiegler’s account of phenomenological 
becoming, a certain ‘writing’ already seems to take place in every moment of presence, 
for every moment becomes the ‘already-there,’ as though written on one’s memory of 
the moment, and one then interprets oneself accordingly: reading ‘what is still unfolding 
of what has already occurred.’ However, this figurative writing of presence onto 
consciousness can never provide the self with completeness. This is why Stiegler 
characterises the self’s completeness only  
 
in the form of the exemplary promise of a coherence remaining absolutely still to 
come … This coherence, which can be nothing but a unity promised like a future 
seeking its necessity, is traversed and ‘cracked’ by the irreducible fact that the 
same gives way to the different and the diverse, and that my performance of myself 
lets me know myself as an other – that I am myself that/an other … only a fiction, a 
projection, a phantasm of me, a me adopting personae… 24 
Stiegler is here still describing phenomenological becoming, where coherence remains 
‘absolutely still to come’; and yet his gesture towards the idea of ‘a future seeking its 
necessity’ might be read as an anticipation of the kind of coherence provided by 
narrative form. 
For the living subject, this kind of narrative coherence remains its constant 
prospect, remaining perpetually on the horizon of its becoming in time, as its future 
possibility. When a life story is already written, on the other hand, the identity of the 
narrator is made coherent (within the confines of this writing) by the narrative 
configuration of the time of becoming. One’s life now becomes bounded by the block-
view of time, where the future is pre-existent.25 If one is reading a narrative for the first 
time, then one is held in suspense about its protagonist’s future, and one does appear to 
witness a process of becoming unfolding in the story being narrated, while nonetheless 
knowing that everything that one is reading has already been shaped by a writer’s hand. 
The question these reflections on narrative identity pose to our reading of Lerner’s text 
is: what novel strategies (in the sense of novelty and in the sense of being immanent in 
novelistic form) does Lerner adopt to render the uncertain contingency looming on his 
narrator’s horizon of phenomenological becoming, within the temporally foreclosed 
structure of narrative time? 
 
 
Prolepsis and a play with tense 
In order to answer this question we need to consider Lerner’s use of prolepsis or, more 
accurately, his playful adaptation of this narrative device that has become pervasive in 
contemporary fiction about memory.26 Literary study has learnt much about prolepsis 
courtesy of Marcel Proust’s seminal À la recherche du temps perdu (1913-1927), and 
Gerard Genette’s discussion of Proust’s ingenious manipulation of story time in 
narrative discourse.27 Prolepsis is the narration of a story’s future events out of 
sequence. A well-worn use of prolepsis occurs in crime fiction, where the narrative 
often begins after the crime has already been committed, so that, having begun with this 
jump forwards in story time, the remainder of the narrative will go back to the 
beginning to unravel what lead up to the murder being committed. A detective fiction’s 
narrator may even be already dead, going back in time post-mortem to tell us of what 
lead up to his or her demise, as happens in Billy Wilder’s noir classic, Sunset Boulevard 
(1950). Lerner’s narrative begins with an unusual kind of prolepsis: in the opening 
paragraphs, the narrator outlines what essentially proves to be the shape of the novel we 
are reading, 
A few months before, the agent had emailed me that she believed I could get a 
“strong six-figure” advance based on a story of mine that had appeared in the New 
Yorker [entitled ‘The Golden Vanity’, which is reproduced in this novel]; and all I 
had to do was promise to turn it into a novel. I managed to draft an earnest if 
indefinite proposal and soon there was a competitive auction among the major New 
York houses and we were eating cephalopods in what would become the opening 
scene. “How exactly will you expand the story?” she’d asked, far look in her eyes 
because she was calculating tip.  
 “I’ll project myself into several futures simultaneously,” I should have said, “a 
minor tremor in my hand; I’ll work my way from irony to sincerity in the sinking 
city, a would-be Whitman of the vulnerable grid.”28 
 
Note that he couches this proleptic outline in the past modal tense - what he ‘should 
have said’ to his agent - as though wishing he could rewrite the past (of course he can 
but chooses not to), in order for this past to tally up neater with his future, the story he is 
presently narrating. From the very beginning of this novel, we thus already observe the 
continual shaping force of narrative form over memory, as we similarly saw this re-
shaping at work in Ben’s account of the Challenger disaster. 
Ben’s promise to project himself into several futures is in a sense the promise of 
every novel: it is the promise offered by reading a narrative for the first time, when 
possibilities abound in our ignorance of the story’s plot. What makes this promise more 
difficult for this narrator to realize, however, is the fact that he is an autodiegetic 
narrator, and consequently already knows the future of his own narrated self. 
Regardless, the story to come in this novel is all about the past Ben’s repeated attempts 
to project himself into several future possibilities and fearful outcomes. And, in the 
novel’s final pages, the modal proleptic opening appears to become fulfilled. Having 
recounted his and his friend Alex’s long trek through the temporarily shut-down areas 
of Downtown Manhattan, following a second hurricane (‘in the sinking city’), he 
suddenly switches tenses, from past to future simple, desiring to ‘say something to the 
schoolchildren of America’: 
everything … I hear tonight will sound like Whitman, the similitudes of the past, 
and those of the future, corresponding … tonight even parasitic insects will appear 
to me as a bad form of collectivity that can stand as a figure of its possibility, 
circulating blood from host to host. Like a joke cycle, like a prosody. Don’t get 
carried away, Alex will say, when she offers me a penny – no – strong six figures 
for my thoughts.29 
The concluding line of the novel then has this narrator, as he aims for the heights of 
poetic sincerity, finally become a ‘would-be Whitman’ for the twenty-first century, as 
 
Lerner typographically renders the sentence as verse: ‘I know it’s hard to understand / I 
am with you, and I know how it is.’30 Lerner’s use of prolepsis in the opening to his 
narrative is therefore a kind of reverse act of homage to Proust, in that whereas Marcel 
concludes the last volume of his narrative with the promise to write it (the book he now 
feels ready to write, but which is all-too evidently the book the reader is about to 
complete reading), Lerner’s narrator promises to write the book to come at the start, but 
this is a book he has already written, where the ending is already closing-in over the 
horizon of the beginning.31 
Lerner is evidently a self-conscious writer and this self-consciousness has to do 
in large part with his awareness of the temporal imposition facing the writer of memory: 
simply enough, in narrative the future is not open. More than this: for writers and 
readers living in an atmosphere dense with stories, narrative time comes to inflect 
everyday life itself. The understanding of lived experience may take on a character 
more appropriate to a narrative representation of time. Mark Currie offers the clearest 
account in contemporary critical thinking on this phenomenon of life borrowing an 
understanding of time from narrative:  
It is more rational to think of narrative, the already-there-ness of its future, and its 
tangible block view of its own universe, as a model which exactly fails to represent 
the ontological conditions of human beings. In this failure, the model of time which 
is being offered by narrative does its work by crossing the boundary between actual 
and potential futures to produce a hermeneutic circle between narrative and time, 
which encourages us to envisage futures on the model of teleological retrospect 
which narrative encodes.32 
The innovation in Lerner’s novelistic rendering of memory, I suggest, has to do with his 
narrator’s self-conscious awareness of how teleological retrospect increasingly orders 
our experience of time, as well as his effort to represent this strange sense of 
 
retrospective futurity as it is experienced outside of fiction within his fiction. In yet 
another moment of announcing a thesis, Ben informs the reader in direct address: 
I decided to replace the book I’d proposed with the book you are reading now, a 
work that, like a poem, is neither fiction nor nonfiction, but a flickering between 
them; I resolved to dilate my story not into a novel about literary fraudulence, 
about fabricating the past, but into an actual present alive with multiple futures.33 
The problem he faces here is that this is obviously an impossible goal, due to the closed 
borders that narrative imposes on time, and which means that one is always condemned 
to writing about what has already occurred. Nevertheless, his narrative does manage to 
gesture towards ‘multiple futures,’ to somehow pry open a crack in narrative’s block of 
closed time. 
The way that Ben manages to achieve this, I have suggested, is through his 
playful adaptation of prolepsis, and before examining this adaptation further, we first 
need to consider how the use of prolepsis in fiction may produce a kind of 
depresentification of lived events outside of fiction, meaning that the form of narrative 
predisposes the writer/reader to see present events in the ‘light shed’ on them by their 
future explanation. As Curries argues, 
prolepsis, which articulates any past moment to some known moment subsequent 
to it, in a constant repetition of a hermeneutic circle of presentification and 
depresentification … joins the backwards movement of explanation to the forwards 
movement of life in a way that seems to deprive us of unmediated presence of 
fictional events, installing in the present a position of future retrospect from which 
an explanation of the present might be possible.34 
Prolepsis deprives the present time of fiction of its presentness, precisely because it 
predisposes the reading of fiction’s present to a view of its future meaning, under the 
shadow of the future retrospection of the present moment. Lerner’s narrator, in an 
 
implicit reaction to this narrative logic, seeks to restore a sense of ‘unmediated 
presence’ to past events represented in his memory narrative; and he performs this 
restoration of presence by repeatedly depicting the experience of failed prolepsis as it 
happened in his life. Claiming that prolepsis could ‘happen’ in life is of course a 
contradiction in terms: in life, unlike in narrative, future events cannot be lived out of 
turn. Life, as the unpredictable itself, precludes the very possibility of prolepsis. Failed 
prolepsis, in my sense, is another term for frustrated expectation, but specifically in the 
sense of an anticipated future event in terms of which we often experience our presence, 
which shadows our presence with the possibility of its arrival, and yet which (almost 
always) fails to arrive.  
Anxiety about imminent danger is a useful emotion in this context, in that it is 
one that carries some philosophical weight. The future shows us its true face in the 
prospect of imminent danger, as Derrida famously writes: ‘The future can only be 
anticipated in the form of absolute danger. This is what produces the absolute break 
with constituted normality and can thus be announced, presented, only as a 
monstrosity.’35 During moments of anticipated danger, not knowing how we are going 
to react to an unforeseen experience, during such breaks with ‘constituted normality,’ 
our experience of presence suddenly becomes vertiginously open, undecided. We are 
then reminded that life is not at all like a book, despite the fact that we may be prone to 
live (read) it as such, prosthetically pre-disposed as we are to think of time in the future 
anterior mode, through the technology of writing. In confronting danger, our 
experience, at least temporarily, ceases to be depresentified. Daniel Katz, in his 
discussion of 10:04 in relation to Lerner’s poetics, observes in this regard that ‘The 
novel is concerned throughout with how a horizon of [the] future, itself unrealizable, is 
at the same time the single most determining factor dictating how we live every 
 
“present” we are allowed to inhabit.’36  For the narrator, this horizon is continually seen 
through the shimmer of a kind of Heideggerian Angst; to recite Blanchot, his future is 
an imminent avalanche threatening to crash over the present. For instance, when Ben 
and his young student Roberto are working on Roberto’s prehistoric diorama, Ben 
experiences one of his regular attacks of vertiginous panic, this time giving it expression 
in Stieglerian fashion, when he describes a sudden sensation of agnosia (while holding a 
pair of safety scissors): ‘a condition brought on by the intuition of spatial and temporal 
collapse or, paradoxically, an overwhelming sense of its sudden integration, as when a 
Ugandan warlord appears via YouTube in an undocumented Salvadorean child’s 
Brooklyn-based dream of a future wrecked by dramatically changing weather patterns 
… Roberto, like me, tended to figure the global apocalyptically.’37 We seem to run up 
against an obstacle, however, when we reflect that the fearful future Ben is gesturing 
towards here is only available to us as in the present, as phenomenological subjects, 
while he can only describe how his past self once figured the global present/future. 
Nonetheless, it is through re-invoking his past self’s experiences of fear and uncertainty 
that he manages to conjure a sense of future openness, and we can now turn to a key 
moment in the text that embodies this process at work. 
Below is a painting by Jules Bastien-Lepage, Joan of Arc (1879), a detail of 
which is reproduced in the novel (see Figure 1). Joan’s outstretched hand is partially 
transparent: she is beginning to disappear from her present, a sign of her future demise, 
her fate known to the group of angels observing her, on the painting’s left. 
 
 
Figure 1. Jules Bastien-Lepage. Joan of Arc 1879, oil on canvas, 254 x 279.4 cm. The 
Metropolitan Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
 
Ben reads this painting as a depiction of the consequences of a kind of time travel: for 
Joan of Arc, her future already threatens to eat away her present, or, as he says, ‘she’s 
being pulled into the future.’38 This painting may be read as a visual demonstration of 
narrative temporality in action: in the sense that, like the omniscient angels in the 
painting who know the future of this historical character, a narrator similarly knows the 
future of her character (or of her own past self as character). In this sense, the narrator 
Ben similarly views the narrated Ben as flickering between two orders of temporality, 
alternatingly almost merging with his narrated self (and thus ‘not knowing’ his own 
 
future), and then departing from him and creating authorial distance (and already 
knowing the future from which he is narrating).39 
The narrator’s narrative strategy to render present his past self’s sense of an 
open future, then, is to reproduce his experience of failed expectation, of fears which 
never materialised as existential facts, but were real enough to accent his past 
experience with the shadow of their threat. Lerner’s narrative is thereby not just a record 
of past events, as we have come to expect from autofiction,40 but equally a record of 
failed foresight: of how anxieties about spectral future events left their traces on his 
narrated self’s consciousness. It is as though, in chronicling instances of failed 
expectation, false prognoses, Ben is aiming to get us to forget that we are in fact reading 
a narrative, for the simple reason that such worries about future threats which evaporate 
when they fail to arrive is an all too common feature of quotidian existence. For 
instance, early in the novel, after learning of the prognosis of an imminent hurricane, 
Ben and Alex are anxiously stocking up on supplies in the local supermarket, for the 
anticipated citywide shutdown. Ben then describes how such a moment of anticipated 
danger seems to open up the future. In case the reader should miss the philosophical 
significance of this idea, Lerner employs italics in the key sentence:  
Everything will be as it is now, just a little different – nothing in me or the store 
had changed, except maybe my aorta, but, as the eye [of the hurricane] drew near, 
what normally felt like the only possible world became one among many, its 
meaning everywhere up for grabs, however briefly – in the passing commons of a 
train, in a container of tasteless coffee.41  
Ben here perceives everyday reality afresh; banal objects, even a ‘container of tasteless 
coffee,’ become suddenly noticeable, tangible to perception. He then spends the night at 
Alex’s apartment, only to wake up in the early hours of the morning of the storm to find 
that it had passed with minor damage to their neighbourhood.  
 
During the previous evening, a present that had been coloured-in, indeed made 
present, by the prospect of imminent danger, Ben had felt more intimate with his friend, 
even uncharacteristically stroking her hair while she slept. When ‘constituted normality’ 
is restored, however, the past seems to have lost the significance it then had. Ben 
considers kissing the sleeping Alex on the forehead, but quickly rejects this impulse:  
whatever intimacy had opened up between us had dissolved with the storm; even 
that relatively avuncular gesture would be strange for both of us now. More than 
that: it was as though this physical intimacy with Alex, just like the sociability with 
strangers or the aura around objects wasn’t just over, but retrospectively erased. 
Because those moments had been enabled by a future that had never arrived, they 
could not be remembered from this future that, at and as the present, had obtained; 
they’d faded from the photograph.42 
There is a pregnant contradiction in the above passage that needs to be read closely. 
Stating that these past moments (of tangible presence made possible by anticipated 
danger) have been ‘retrospectively erased’ and ‘could not be remembered’ is 
nonsensical, in narrative terms, for we had just read their description a few paragraphs 
earlier in the text, which the narrator described as though he again experienced that 
sense of foreshadowing. The narrator’s claim perhaps contains some phenomenological 
truth, in the sense that we do tend to forget how past fears once accented our 
experience; these past fears, no longer real, are easily erased from present recollection. 
More importantly, though, the obvious contradiction of stating that this fleeting 
exposure to pure contingency and openness can no longer ‘be remembered from this 
future that, at and as present, had obtained,’ is intended to delineate, once again, two 
orders of temporality: narrative temporality versus phenomenological becoming, 
represented here as the time of the narrated and the time of narrating. From the 
perspective of the narrator looking back on himself and becoming ‘one’ with his past 
 
self as a character in his own story, he perceives that ‘fading’ of himself caused by his 
past self’s fear of imminent danger. Figuratively speaking, were Ben as narrated 
character to see himself as Joan depicted in Bastien-Lepage’s painting, his outstretched 
hand would be transparent. However, since the feared catastrophe failed to arrive, for 
the narrating Ben this past experience of fear can no longer be fully re-experienced 
exactly as his past self experienced it when he had lived through his fearful anticipation 
of the hurricane. Thus, for the narrating Ben the outstretched hand would be intact. 
But now we pause and reflect: if Ben the narrator is right in his claim that these 
past moments can no longer be recollected with the passing of the hurricane’s threat, 
then how is it that, as the narrating-I who is no longer living under the cloud of his 
narrated-I’s fears, he nonetheless does manage to describe exactly that experience? In 
first-person narration, as Currie’s observes, 
the narrator is [always] located after the end of the represented sequence: if the 
narrator flashes into view, so does the future; if not, the trace of that narrator can 
nevertheless be found in the very retrospect of every narrative sentence, as a mark 
of the future in the present.43  
What this means is that the future/narrating Ben was already present, in the very act of 
narration, when he was describing the past/narrated Ben’s experiences in the 
supermarket and at Alex’s apartment. Thus, what Ben’s claim is affirming, in its very 
paradoxicality, is that narrative is able to contain those experiences of possibility, of 
imminence threatening to rupture the present, of one’s past self. Ben’s paradoxical 
claim may therefore be read as a reaffirmation of the often uncanny magic of self-
narration: that, despite knowing this to be impossible, we do read and write our past 
selves as though we again relived ‘their’ concerns, which are no longer ‘ours.’ 
Narrative, we have seen, allows the narrating-I to configure the mimesis of 
becoming one with the narrated-I’s past experience, because it instructs the narrating-I 
 
to think of time as an object of a future memory, and of course being able to imagine 
how the narrated self would have thought of time in these same terms. In another 
moment of anticipation of future danger, Ben is anxious about his heart (having earlier 
in the novel been diagnosed with a rare heart disorder), during a check-up in a 
cardiologist’s rooms: ‘So clearly could I picture the cardiologist walking in to inform 
me that the speed of dilation required immediate intervention that it was as though it 
had already happened, predicting it felt like recalling a traumatic event.’44 We find 
ourselves here in the realm of the ‘as though’: of figuring life as narrative, living as 
though one were part of a pre-written narrative, where prediction is already the same 
thing as recollection. Instead of discounting the fears of his past self, from the 
perspective of a wiser present self, the narrator may be read here as demonstrating how 
an understanding of time derived from fiction, and from narrative more generally, often 
bears in a quite tangible way on present experience of time. If one is a writer, then one’s 
present fears and anticipations are especially apt to become events anticipated in the 
mode of retrospect, so that one is, as it were, projecting oneself even further into the 
future than the event anticipated, and thereby already imagining oneself looking back on 
that event, as though already remembering it. Ben himself neatly spells out this logic, 
when, reflecting on his conversation with his friend Noor about often experiencing a 
sense of self-estrangement, like his earlier sensation of agnosia, he muses: ‘discovering 
you are not identical with yourself even in the most disturbing and painful way still 
contains the glimmer, however refracted, of a world to come, where everything is the 
same but a little different because the past will be citable in all of its moments, 
including those that from our present present happened but never occurred.’45 
This sentence is saying something profound about the novel’s capacity to 
represent possibility, to gesture towards it, despite the temporally foreclosed nature of 
 
narrative time. In order to zero in on its significance, I turn to Gary Saul Morson’s term 
‘sideshadowing,’ taken from his invigorating study of narrative temporality, Narrative 
and Freedom: The Shadows of Time (1994). Morson acknowledges that narrative time 
is ultimately deterministic and closed, as it seems to offer us only two possible 
explanations of its structure: ‘backshadowing’, where past events are interpreted as 
ineluctably leading up to the present, and ‘foreshadowing’, where ‘a shadow is cast in 
advance of its object’,46 suggesting that the future object already exists and can be 
known in advance. ‘Sideshadowing’ is then Morson’s term for a narrative stratagem that 
several writers have employed in various ways (his focus is chiefly on Tolstoy and 
Dostoevsky), in order to sidestep narrative’s in-built sense of fatalism, and it requires 
that ‘[along] with an event, we see its alternatives; with each present, another possible 
present … In this way, the hypothetical shows through the actual and so achieves its 
own shadowy kind of existence in the text.’47 Morson argues that the novel has a unique 
ability to deepen our understanding of time’s openness, in its potential for thus 
sideshadowing what happened with what could have happened: ‘By restoring the 
presentness of the past and cultivating a sense that something else might have happened, 
sideshadowing restores some of the presentness that has been lost. It alters the way we 
think about earlier events and the narrative models used to describe them.’48 To return 
to Ben’s statement: his narrative imagination enables him to restore the ‘presentness’ of 
his past by citing those moments when the future seemed perilously open, undecidable, 
moments that for his-then-present-self ‘happened but never occurred’. By thus 
‘sideshadowing’ its narrator’s present, Lerner’s novel allows us to see ghostly events 
that might have happened palimpsestically superimposed over what ‘occurred’. In other 
words, it is as though we get a glimpse, by vicariously living through these moments of 
so-called failed prolepses, of the spectral presence of future events that could have 
 
happened; we thus see both what did happen and catch a glimpse of another future 
‘timeline’, as we come to inhabit a present shadowed over by these hypothetical 
eventualities. Ben’s sideshadowing of his past self’s present with the futural pull of 
anticipated events thus demonstrates how the future comes to exercise its ‘presence’, or 
how it somehow presences itself not only in moments of present expectation, but also in 
moments of retrospective narration. 
This narrative strategy is thus the narrator’s way of articulating our 
contemporary sense of time, a sense fostered by digital mnemotechnologies and the 
pervasive soup of stories wherein much of our consciousness is daily immersed. Ben’s 
difficulty is that he is at pains to say that life is not like a book, but he still has to make 
this proclamation within the confines of a book’s covers. Ordinary life is seldom 
ruptured by catastrophe, but it is often rippled by waves of worry issuing into 
consciousness from fearfully imagined futures. By recording instances of failed 
predictions, which for his past self already appeared to him in their guise as future 
memories, Ben is seeking after greater verisimilitude in narrating the contemporary 
experience of time. He seeks to express, more precisely, how real life is often already 
lived as though it were a work of fiction; as Currie suggests:  
When we read a novel we make present events that are in the past, and when we 
live life we often do the opposite: we live the present as if it were already in the 
past, as if it were the object of a future memory.49  
This means that when we live life it is as though we were living a story in the process of 
being written, a story not yet complete but whose completion we were anticipating, in 
imagining ourselves already looking back on our present. If fiction is, as Currie 
suggests, about making present events that are past, then Ben’s recounting of failed 
expectations, which his narrated-I already conceived as his future memories, may be 
 
seen as rendering in the world of his story precisely that experience of living the present 
moment as a future memory, that sense of depresentification increasingly familiar 
outside the borders of fiction. Lerner, in short, may be read as providing a fictional self-
reflexive model of what Currie calls ‘the fashion for prolepsis’ in contemporary culture, 
and modern narrative in general, which encourages one to think of the actual present as 
already a future memory, and which thus ‘produces in the world a generalised future 
orientation such that the understanding of the present becomes increasingly focused on 
the question of what it will come to mean.’50 
As memory is today increasingly relegated to digital recording technologies, and 
as the so-called industrial media complex co-produces the social reality it purports 
merely to report, what hope is there for an individual consciousness but to turn into an 
automaton, living a life prescripted by these globally mediated narratives? This is 
Stiegler’s distressed question, but it is one which might be reformulated in slightly less 
radical terms, if we turn to Mark Hansen’s comment on Stiegler’s prognosis of our 
‘cultural malaise.’51 ‘Stiegler,’ Hansen writes, ‘suggests that today’s culture industries 
exert a stranglehold on our subjectivity through their hyperstandardisation; by 
synchronising the time of consciousness at the global level, they position commodified 
memories as the basis for the collective invention of the future.’52 Taking into account 
Hansen’s invocation of the idea of invention, the question may now be rephrased as: do 
these commodified global memories predetermine the kind of future we could invent? 
Stiegler’s own answer to this question seems to vacillate between the affirmative and 
the negative. When he prognosticates the future as a dystopian world of ‘automatonous’ 
rather than autonomous individuals, society becoming a hive-like global ‘One,’ the 
answer appears to be affirmative.53 Yet his own account of the essence of technics 
actually undermines this bleak prophecy: technics, we recall, is for Stiegler the very 
 
source of the possible. Every tool – and for human beings writing is surely their greatest 
tool – is ‘already a projection screen’ that promises its user, in Stiegler’s own words, 
‘the capacity to project a future.’54 
‘I’ll project myself into several futures simultaneously’: this is the daring 
promise offered us by Lerner’s narrator, at the start of the novel. As a child he 
witnessed a mass-mediated memory, which was originally intended as a projection into 
the future, of the Challenger shuttle disaster. The global coverage of the space shuttle’s 
launch was planned well in advance, as part of a larger globally mediated narrative of 
America’s stellar position on the political stage, as a technological and financial 
superpower, in the wave of retrospectively misguided optimism that characterised 
American politics during the Ronald Reagan administration. Yet what was intended – 
pre-scripted – to be the recounting of a triumphal national event turned into a tragic 
accident. In a moment, the future as shock intervened and a prewritten narrative of 
national pride was instantly transformed into catastrophe. The significance of Ben 
selecting this particular moment as the foundation of his story of origins as a poet lies in 
part in this event’s undermining of a pre-scripted media narrative. Ben’s narrative as a 
whole is similarly a chronicle of his own failed prognostications of future outcomes, 
thus opening up a sense of the future for both himself and his readers. In this sense, his 
account is narrated against the grain of narrative temporality itself, where anticipation is 
always the same thing as retrospection: in writing about past possibilities that failed to 
arrive, the narrator is keeping a sense of future possibility open, despite the fact of 
narrative’s closed temporal borders keeping it shut. 
 
Narrative’s promise 
As we saw in the beginning of this discussion, the story comes to a close with Ben 
 
describing his and his friend Alex’s long walk south through Manhattan, back to 
Brooklyn, after the second hurricane has ruffled the city. We learn that Alex is now 
pregnant, and Ben is the ‘surrogate’ father. We also recall that the narrator here 
suddenly switches tenses: the novel’s last two paragraphs are narrated in the future 
simple tense, rather than the expected preterite. In Brooklyn, they will board a bus, he 
writes, and ‘I will stand and offer my seat to an elderly woman […] Then, even though 
it would sound improbable in fiction, [this] woman with the plants will turn to Alex and 
say: Are you expecting? She will explain there is a certain glow. She’ll guess it is a 
girl.’55 The reason this ‘would sound improbable in fiction’ is not only the unlikelihood 
of a stranger making this remark to a woman only in the first eight weeks of pregnancy, 
but also the fact that the narrative has itself switched to a future tense, which is a tense 
improbable in fiction, in light of fiction’s inherent belatedness. In this projected future 
(at least from the perspective of the narrated-I), the writer will become one in spirit with 
his idealized Whitman: ‘It and everything else I hear tonight will sound like Whitman, 
the similitudes of the past, and those of the future, corresponding.’56  
In the final paragraph, Ben and Alex will stop for a meal at a sushi restaurant in 
Prospect Heights, and Ben appears to conclude his narrative with a promise for his own 
future self as writer of memory: 
Sitting at a small table looking through our reflection in the window onto Flatbush 
Avenue, I will begin to remember our walk in the third-person, as if I’d seen it 
from the Manhattan Bridge, but, at the time of writing, as I lean against the chain 
link fence intended to stop jumpers, I am looking back at the totaled city in the 
second person plural. I know it’s hard to understand / I am with you, and I know 
how it is.57 
This promise, by a sleight-of-hand trick in tense midway through the sentence, shifts us 
suddenly into the narrator’s present, ‘the time of writing,’ and becomes a kind of 
 
authorial disclosure. It seems that the future projections narrated earlier were, again, 
failed prolepses, but this time into more utopian possibilities. There is of course also the 
possibility that the switch to the future simple tense is simply a game with the reader: all 
the narrator is doing here is recounting his memory of events that have already 
occurred, but events which for his past self were still to come. Both readings remain 
open, as we shimmer through temporalities. Regardless, describing the narration of 
one’s memory through these temporal shifts – from the accustomed preterite tense, to 
the jump into the future simple, and then the final switch into the present58 - emphasizes 
the always retrospective promise of narrative as a vital technology for personal memory. 
Ben’s statement, ‘I will begin to remember our walk in the third-person,’ is testimony to 
narrative’s ability to think future memory, or to think of the future as a memory which 
one will have recounted back to oneself as a character in a story, to a future self that will 
also be changed by this act of narration. Narrative form is, to adopt again Stiegler’s 
phrasing, the site for the ‘the inscription, within a living being, of a possible.’59 
The reinvention of contemporary experience, through the art of narration, is a 
creative act that always comes too late, only arriving after experience; which also 
means, however, that it is an act that belongs to the future. As long as one is able to 
narrate one’s memories and to figure one’s past as narrative, one is enabled to project 
oneself into the future as the object of one’s own future memories, as the character 
authored by oneself and playing the part of oneself in the future story of one’s life, and 
thus resist the threats to consciousness posed by global media homogenization and 
standardization of content. If narrative, as a prosthesis on which memory depends, 
contains within itself the capacity to figure the past according to the past’s future 
recollection, then so long as one can narrate experience one can resist the 
‘automatonous’ reification, the total loss of anamnesis anticipated by Stiegler. Narrating 
 
anamnesis forestalls the possibility of its loss. From this perspective, Lerner’s novel 
might be said to speak the following philosophical reasoning through its form: I, as the 
writer of my memory, continue to anticipate myself as the narrated-other in the story 
about myself, whom I will have created on the narrative prosthetic screen for my future, 
whereon my memory awaits to be re-told. Narrative conceived as prosthesis allows us 
to read the novel as providing the temporal grammar for rewriting, and thus always 
potentially refiguring, both our past and the possibilities for our individual and 
collective future. So long as narratives are still being read, in an age of a seeming 
foreclosure of future possibilities, literary singularities like 10:04 may yet be written, 
providing models for the articulation of memory to its possible futures. This is the 
promise of narrative form construed as technics, a prosthesis vital to the grasp of our 
own time. 
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